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Introduction and Theses 
N onhuman animals are vulnerable to all manner of plights and plun-dering at the hands both of nature and of human institutions and 
practices, from predation, natural disaster, and 
disease to trapping, veal-calf crating, and electric 
shock. In this paper we explore a certain class of 
such plights and plundering and those features 
of animals that leave them peculiarly vulnerable 
to them. In the spirit of Heidegger's distinction 
between the ontic and ontological,l we will call 
these an animal's "ontological vulnerability." 
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The term will be clarified further through the 
presentation. For the moment, an example from 
my own field of phenomenological psychology 
provides an initial handle. In his early work on 
schizophrenic and schizoid ways of being, R.D. 
Laing (1965) describes a type of person who lives 
as if he or she is not a self but is a thing. He or 
she is not just an inadequate or a bad self, but is a 
no-self. Such a being does not live as a center of 
autonomous action. As distinguished from the 
loss of a particular self, this loss implies an onto-
logical vulnerability in that there is, at least appar-
ently, a loss of the structure that makes it possible 
for a person to become any particular self.2 
We will describe two types of such vulnerability 
in nonhuman animals. The first is a vulnerability 
to the loss of individuality. Again, the threatened 
loss here is not merely the failure to achieve a 
particular style or feature, or personal or social 
history that might constitute an animal as an 
individual, but is the ontological threat of loss of 
the possibility of being an individual. We will link 
this death of the individual to a humanistic 
concept which categorically excludes nonhuman 
animals from the status of individual. Finally, we 
will suggest that certain features of animals, such 
as limitations in reflective and linguistic capac-
ities, invite this reductive social construction of 
animality. 
The second type of ontological vulnerability is 
a loss of species identification wherein an animal 
becomes what we will call a "generic animal" or 
an organism. This reduction is exemplified 
through an account of laboratory research using 
animals. It will argued that this vulnerability is 
made possible through a radical dependence in 
the case of nonhuman animals on their species 
specific habitat, by contrast to the human possi-
bility of a relative transformation, through sym-
bolism, of his or her setting. By contrast to the 
first type, we will show that this second reduction, 
more clearly, actually occurs. Beyond the social 
construction of the generic animal, we actually 
create such beings. 
In that my approach here is that of a phe-
nomenologically orien ted social scien tist, for 
both types I will first describe certain contem-
porary ways of living toward nonhuman animals 
which both build on and help sustain the two 
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ontological reductions. This approach is akin to 
but distinguishable from an analysis using label 
and social role assignmen t (Herzog, 1988). It is 
more directly a derivative of the social phe-
nomenological approach of Schutz in which 
reality is described as a social construction con-
sisting of networks of typifIcations (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). However, in addition to 
describing relevant ways of living toward a par-
ticular object, in regard to the second reduction, 
I will also attempt a more direct explication of 
that object's, an animal's, way of being, again 
employing phenomenological method.s 
The term "death of the animal" is an allusion 
to Barthes' "death of the author" (1977). In that 
seminal postmodernist essay, Barthes crystallizes 
the sense in which certain intellectual trends are 
changing the way we live toward authorship. For 
example, in this attitude a text is less the creative 
fulfillment of an individual artistic intention than 
it is a conduit for prevalent images and ideas in 
various language communities. The author has 
died in the sense that we, including the author, 
no longer live toward what he or she is doing in 
"creating" a text as authorship, in the traditional 
meaning of autonomous creative agent. By 
"death of the animal" I refer both to our living 
toward animals as a reduced kind of being and to 
practices that actually effect an ontological 
reduction in animals. 
1. Deindividuation: An Animal As Species 
Although subtle and complex in their origins 
and maintenance, the ways we refuse to live 
toward an animal as an individual are familiar 
and pervasive. When I argue with a deer hunter 
or my neighbor who now permits trapping his 
land where my dog used to run, or the local 
game warden, we usually talk past each other. We 
do so not simply because we disagree (I can talk 
to Republicans), but because I tend to refer to 
that deer as that individual, the one the hunter 
wounded and then, after tracing the buck in the 
field across the way, killed; while he or she refers 
to "the deer," as for example, the status of the 
deer species in Maine this fall following a partic-
ularly mild winter and early spring. "The deer" 
refers to a species as a reified entity rather than 
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as an aggregate of individual deer. General aca-
demic consensus notwithstanding (Munson, 
1971), for him or her a species is not an 
abstraction. Correlatively, that deer he or she just 
killed is not (or was not) a concretely present 
individual, for anyone deer is largely lived 
toward as a part of that reification, "the deer." 
Our difference is not just talk. We live toward 
and act in regard to that deer accordingly. The 
distinction is a fundamental one at the level of 
the structure of our respective experiences. In 
phenomenological terms, Husserl makes a strong 
distinction between an act in which we mean an 
object as an individual and one in which our 
object is an instance of some specific feature (in 
Farber, p. 246). In the former case, we "simply 
mean the appearing thing itself' (that deer right 
there), while in the latter we refer to some spe-
cific feature or features of that deer, some idea or 
content of deerness. In the latter case, the spe-
cific feature is focal (here a feature or features 
that identify a particular species), while the indi-
vidual, that deer there, is backdrop. More radi-
cally, the existing and present individual is 
forgotten or nonexistent while the abstract and 
absent species is all there is. 
Ironically, while at least apparently, it is the 
hunter who is "being there" with that individual 
deer (I once got within fifty yards of a deer), 
while it is the hunter who lets that buck live or 
suffer and die, who touches him and his life-
blood at the moment of his death, that deer is 
not there for him or her. What is there is an 
impersonalized, deindividualized but reified 
abstraction, as, for example, some feature of the 
population of the deer herd in Maine. In the 
same move, this reification of the species dis-
solves the individual deer and invests the 
aggregate of, now, non-individuals with a kind of 
unified being that allows members of the species 
to be killed as if they were so much grass being 
mowed. In Heidegger's term, this deer is lived 
toward as a "standing reserve," a resource there 
waiting for our use (1977). 
While readily apparen t in wildlife man-
agement practices, deindividuation is not limited 
to that context. Down on the factory farm, indi-
vidual animals are long gone. Factory or 
intensive farming began to accelerate in devel-
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opment during the years around World War II 
(Mason & Singer, 1980). There the tension is 
between the two poles of our second ontological 
reduction - from species to generic animal. 
"Beef," "pork," and "chicken" are vestiges of 
species-specific consideration. "Meat" is already a 
reference to the generic animal. (Of course, a 
further reduction, not dealt with in this paper, is 
from generic animal to commodity, from meat to 
price ofmeat, from animal to stock.) 
But even the companion animal, among 
whom is "man's best friend," is vulnerable to 
deindividuation. Our consciousness of breed 
often supplants our awareness of even our own 
pet's individuality. Temperament, peculiarities, 
personality are lived toward as species-specific 
rather than as idiosyncratic, as a feature of this 
individual. When my dog dies, friends suggest 
that I go out and replace him - you'll feel 
better, they say with best intentions. That I lived 
with that dog for eight years, that I saw him 
through the death of his adoptive mother and 
the trapping inciden t and that he saw me 
through comparable events in my life is of no 
count. Their reference is not to that particular, 
historical intimate relation, to the world we had 
together; rather, implicitly they refer to black 
labs and how they make gentle companions. This 
attitude allows the practice of abandonment in 
shelters and "sacrifice" in labs of our nonhuman 
animal companions. 
A version of a utilitarian ethic, what Singer 
calls the total view (1979, p. 100) embodies a 
derivative form of deindividuation. In this view, a 
being is merely a receptacle of something 
valuable. That valuable something can be as 
easily contained in another receptacle. Hence, 
the replacement of one with another has no 
ethical cost. In more phenomenological terms, 
Laing and Cooper, explicating Sartre, describe a 
relation of seriality in which one individual lives 
toward a second in a relation of externality and 
interchangeability (1971). In their example (pp. 
121-2), the person in front of me when I am 
waiting for a bus is reduced to a member ofa col-
lectivity. Being only one of so many in line, he or 
she is identical with and replaceable by any other 
member of the group. This serial identity and 
consequent replaceability is in turn made pos-
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sible by the fact that each entity is lived toward as 
a receptacle of certain features common to the 
group. Each entity in the line is only a place-
taker as each black lab is only a container of 
certain features of that species. So, I can go out 
and replace him. 
One way to understand how we come to deindi-
viduate nonhuman animals so pervasively and, 
typically, so thoughtlessly involves a review of the 
history of "individual" as a social construction. As I 
have argued more fully elsewhere (Shapiro, in 
press, a.), one still dominant social construction of 
individuality took nonhuman animals as the cat~ 
gorical foil. In this construction animals are 
defined as the exemplar non-individual in order 
to more discretely and exclusively preserve indi-
viduality for human animals. A humanistic phi-
losophy defined rationality or reason as that 
feature which is both free and freeing. It argued 
that free reason is the sine qua non of individuality, 
for only an individual is self-determining or 
autonomous. Precisely in distinction from 
humans, nonhuman animals are instinct and 
need-dominated rather than rational. Despite its 
etymological origin in spirit or mind (L. animus) 
and in quickening or moving autonomously (L. 
animare), in this construction "animal" refers to 
the instinctoid, the biologically determined, the 
nonrational. Given the gulf between nonhuman 
and human animals created by this ideology, 
humanistic philosophy can then justifY its rein-
forcement by the epistemology that we can only 
know animals through a scientific method in 
which reason is applied to objective and distanced 
observation of these now strangely "other" crea-
tures. In the correlative political-legal system, only 
individuals are granted legal rights. Hence, as 
nonindividuals, animals have no rights and no 
legal standing. By sanctioning our forgetting the 
individuality of nonhuman animals, these philoso-
phies and traditions support our living toward 
them as certain reified classifications, as species. 
In a general way, certain features of animals 
permit this discriminatory "modernist," as we now 
call it, conception of the individual. Some animals 
are not rational; others are apparently not; none 
are by traditional humanistic lights. Certainly, 
animals do not appear to be rational to a viewer 
for whom language is a prereqUisite for, if not 
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coterminous with, rationality. The attempts of 
nonhuman animals at communication generally 
seem limited to structures that are less sophisti-
cated than those definitive of language, again, at 
least by humanistic lights. Neither do animals 
assert their individual rights nor, for that maUer, 
make any claims. They do not refer to their 
grievances for their capacity for self-reference is 
very limited.4 Further, their behavior does appear 
to be largely intelligible in terms of its typicality 
for a given species. Both personal identity and 
individuality seem much less prominen t than this 
species-specific behavior. Surely, one could apply 
the quip, attributed to a now obscure political 
figure, "if you've seen one redwood, you've seen 
them all," with almost as much conviction to a 
gazelle or a sea lion. In all of these features, the 
traditional humanistic view of nonhuman found 
easy purchase. 
Of course, the modernist conception of individ-
uality is under attack from many quarters of what 
is loosely referred to as postmodern thought, all 
of which agree that individuality, along with "man" 
himself, is a social construction, a product, in 
Foucault's term, of a particular episteme (1973, p. 
xxii.). Postmodern thought brings human being 
down from its romanticized humanistic heights. 
For example, we have already alluded to the dis-
placement of authorship, from the author as the 
seat of unique, creative intentions, to an emphasis 
on language and language communities that, as it 
were, speak for themselves and in the service of 
which individual authors are mere conduits. An 
"individual" is derivative of language both in the 
sense that individuality itself is a historically 
evolving socio-linguistic construction and in that 
the provenance of what I way, including the story I 
tell to define myself as an individual, is traceable 
to a second-hand loaner from the current culture. 
Utilizing the metaphor of height so often applied, 
(although mistakenly [Midgley, 1978, pp. 158-
160]), to the traditional human-animal distinction 
- if human is a "lower animal" relative to lan-
guage, then, we humans are now closer, in the 
postmodern construction of subject and individu-
ality, to the other lower animals. Language (and 
with it rationality) is no longer the critical cleaver 
between human and animal precisely because it is 
no longer between them, being now conceived as 
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above or as the primary surround or medium 
within which human experience can be mean-
ingful. 
Several other developments complement 
bringing human being down by raising animal 
and, in some instances, inanimate being up. Stone 
(1974) claims legal standing for trees, although he 
has recently retracted or softened his original 
claim (Varner, 1987). Following Whitehead, 
Hartshorne's process philosophy argues a concept 
of individuality so broad as to include plants, and, 
at least in the most primitive of several degrees or 
forms of individuality, each cell within a plant 
(Dombrowski, 1988). Far from premised on an 
exclusionary notion of reason, here individuality 
is "based on a pattern of interaction" (p.4) and 
participation in an event or process. In a stronger 
sense of individuality, animals are true individuals 
in that they are wholes that both participate in 
and experience these events. A final example is, of 
course, Regan's philosophy of animal rights which 
confers the rights of an individual to nonhuman 
animals (at least mammals of more than one year 
of age) on the basis of their being "subjects of a 
life" (1983). 
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In addition to deconstructing modernist claims 
as to the truth about human being in general and 
individuality in partiCUlar, postmodernism offers 
its own more relativistic and self-consciously 
reconstructed views of individuality. One such 
view emphasizes historical context and embed-
dedness and, particularly, narrative accounts of a 
person's history as the stuff of individuality 
(Ricoeur, 1984). "People conceive of themselves 
in terms of stories" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 107); 
individual identity consists in a person's narrative 
account or story of his or her life. 
At first glance it would appear that animals are 
as vulnerable to deindividuation in such a recon-
struction of individuality and individual identity 
as in the earlier modernist conception, for they 
are not historians or story-tellers. However, as I 
have argued elsewhere (Shapiro, in press, b.), 
history informs the experience of a particular 
animal whether or not it can tell that history. 
Events in the life of an animal shape and even 
constitute him or her. To understand my dog 
Sabaka, I need to know his history, how he was 
abandoned at the dump as a pup, how he was 
"raised" by another dog we adopted at roughly 
the same time as Sabaka and how that dog died a 
year later. For, clearly, these vents inform 
Sabaka's behavior, his personality, and partly con-
stitute his individuality. Sabaka is an individual in 
that he is not constituted through and I do not 
live toward him as a species-specific behavioral 
repertoire or developmental sequence. More 
positively, he is an individual in that he is both 
subject to and subject of "true historical partic-
ulars" (Gould, 1987). I can not replace him, nor, 
ethically, can I "sacrifice" him for he is a unique 
individual being. 
2. Generic Animality 
To recapitulate to this point, in the first part 
we argued (1) that we can and do live toward an 
animal forgetting his or her individuality, and (2) 
that a certain vulnerability in nonhuman animals 
allows the social construction which in turn sup-
ports that attitude. 
In this section we will argue that a second 
reduction is possible and indeed prevalent. We 
can and do live toward an animal in a way that 
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denies it its species identity as well as its individu-
ality. ("It" seems the more appropriate pronoun 
as we move from the individual/species to the 
species/generic animal interface.) Here, 
however, we will argue further that this social 
construction and a certain vulnerability in 
animal being combine to effect the actual 
reduction - an animal is reduced to a generic 
being. This reduction is ontological rather than 
ontic in that an animal loses not just a particular 
species identity but the possibility of being any 
species. Since the argument for the actual loss of 
species being is more problematic, we will begin 
with a description of the social construction of a 
generic animal. 
We will argue that this second reduction is 
more prominent in our practices toward labo-
ratory and factory farm animals, while the first 
reduction more often prevails as our attitude 
toward wild and companion animals. However, 
the following introductory example features a 
wild animal for I find the attitude more intu-
itively compelling and more popularly accessible 
in that context. 
A lion in a cage is not a lion. Of course, as we 
stand at the cage in which this animal is 
exhibited, we can imaginatively place it in the 
African savannah, lying near a thicket, having 
shared its kill with its pride and now licking its 
paws and enjoying its repose with a giant yawn. 
But even an individual of this most familiar 
species, mythologized as the king of beasts, we as 
often experience in terms of the stereotypic 
behavior of any large mammal permanently 
housed in a small cage. The repetitive pacing 
and rocking, the lack of interaction with and 
interest in conspecifics and surroundings fail to 
evoke lion country. When our experience takes 
this turn, we are beginning to live toward this 
animal as a generic being, as neither a locus of 
individual nor of species-specific being. 
In the less familiar setting of modern intensive 
animal husbandry, this attitude is almost 
unavoidable. Consider that a chicken, for 
example, shares with three or four other chickens 
a cage the floor of which is little larger than this 
journal page, and that the structure housing the 
cage contains as many as 80,000 chickens (Mason 
and Singer, 1980). For the factory farm worker, 
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the chickens are, focally, a job to be done. They 
are only animals implicitly, occasionally, and, 
undoubtedly, reluctantly. As animals they are 
lived toward as potential meat or eggs, produce, 
or producers of stock for the market. 
In the research laboratory, animals are also 
caged. In this setting they are primarily lived 
toward as objects of study.~ Typically, in both 
biomedical and psychological research, the object 
of study is a general process rather than a species-
specific physiology or behavior. The animal is 
lived toward as a "preparation" (Devereux, 1967) 
where what is being readied is not a rat or cat or 
dog but an organic or behavioral process. 
Whether through stereotaxic fIxation or anes-
thetization or restraint in a Pavlovian sling, the 
preparation or making ready is an attempt to 
eliminate any individual and species identity in 
order to disclose for study a general process, a 
biological organism, a generic animal.· 
The term "generic" has recently become laden 
with meanings and we must pause to unpack it. 
In the supermarket and in the drug store, 
generic brands refer to products that offer the 
genuine article with relatively little packaging, 
and, in some instances, with minimal adulter-
ation and "refinement." Peanut butter becomes 
nothing but peanuts buttered, no longer contam-
inated by dextrose, partially hydrogenated veg-
etable oil, salt and corn sweeteners. By contrast, 
in the context of literary works, generic refers to 
a reduction to a minimal form that delivers a sen-
sationalized, merely titillating derivative without 
the genuine article. On the side of the "author," 
a harlequin romance is a produce made and 
assembled by a formula. On the side of the 
reader, it is ''love'' without a relationship, sensu-
ality without the body, only packaging. 
We read these related cultural trends to 
express an ambivalence between the modernist 
searches for a universal essence and for a trans-
parent self-consciousness. As Lasch has described 
(1979), in recent times the latter has degen-
erated into a narcissism in which the self dis-
solves and is sought in externally provided 
mirrors. An object is generic, then, when its pure 
essence is sought or when merely the effect on 
self of that essence is sought. In this paper, our 
use of the term refers to a possible effect in the 
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object of such ambivalent and confused quests-
namely, the loss of both individual particularity 
and species typicality. 
Since it is common to all of the three 
examples, zoo, factory farm, and laboratory, we 
will take "cage" as a metaphor for the reduction 
to generic animal. While not a necessary con-
comitant, we will use "caging an animal" to refer 
to a way we can live toward an animal kept in a 
radically depleted setting. That divorce from a 
fuller, more "enriched," usually more natural-
istic setting may be in the service of market 
quality, as in intensive farming, or of control, as 
in laboratory research. In the latter, experi-
mental control typically is the attempt to elim-
inate all variability attributable to individual and 
species-specific behavior. Through this regu-
lative ideal, this natural scien tific en terprise 
believes a general or essential nature can be 
revealed. 
When we live toward the lion (or chicken or 
rat) as a caged animal, we have lost both lion 
country and lion behavior, both species-specific 
habitat and behavior or habit. What, if anything, 
is the comparable loss for the animal? We turn 
now to a consideration of the life of an animal 
lived toward as generic. Beyond our social con-
structions of an animal in a cage, we will have to 
show that a particular setting is a precondition for 
a particular species being. Absent that precon-
dition, we can then assess whether the resultant 
generic animal is a destructive trivialization or a 
revelation of the universal; and, finally, whether 
that reduction is harmful to an animal. 
The form of nonhuman animal being is 
ambiguous in that it derives from both individu-
ality and species membership. The relative power 
of the two determinants underlying both (respec-
tively, although only roughly, individual history 
and biological givens) varies in the different 
animal life-forms. We are concerned in this 
section with the contribution of species mem-
bership to an animal's being, with the possibility 
of the loss of that contribution, and with under-
standing what is left following that loss. 
Analogous to the folk-ways that an anthropologist 
locates in a given culture, we will refer to the 
behavioral forms peculiar to and typical of a 
given species as "species-ways." 
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The concept of species must be clarified. For 
Aristotle, each kind of animal has a telos, an 
unchanging nature that distinguishes it and that 
is the "sole determinan t of its form" (Bakan, 
1971, p. 341). By contrast, with Darwin telos or 
species can change gradually, not for a given 
animal but from individual to individual over 
time. In contemporary evolutionary theory, there 
is also the possibility of relatively dramatic and 
discontinuous change in a species or in the emer-
gence of new species (Gould, 1982, pp. 179-186). 
In both these versions of evolutionary theory, 
although species and species-ways can now come 
and go, they do so under nature's auspices. 
However, beyond this loosening of the classical 
notion of telos in evolutionary theory, with the 
advent of behaviorism and genetic engineering 
the concept becomes unrecognizable. In the most 
radical version of behaviorist theory, there is no 
consideration of ways typical of and determined 
by species identity. Environmental contingencies 
determine animal (and human) behavior. An 
animal has no intrinsic nature, species-specific or 
otherwise, beyond its "capacity" to be passively 
determined by its environment. While the envi-
ronment can not quite effect flight in mice (they 
can be "taught" to leap off a platform), it can 
"shape" ping-pong playing and a preference for 
pictures of people, in pigeons. At least in accord 
with this theory, the radical behaviorist already 
lives toward an animal as a generic being. While 
radical behaviorism is in decline, methodological 
behaviorism is still dominan t and, arguably, 
evokes this attitude in the investigator. 
With the development of genetic engineering, 
both the classical and Darwinian concept of 
species are challenged again. With technology 
that allows material from different species to be 
spliced together, animals are produced which 
stretch any notion of the hybridization associated 
with selective breeding. The genetic engineer 
. thinks less in terms of combining discrete 
species-ways and more in terms of gene pools 
that consist of raw material or raw information. 
The genetic code peculiar to a given animal has 
no more intrinsic integrity than one filing system 
among many. A species is a momentary organi-
zation of a certain chunk of information. An 
individual animal is reduced to certain genetic 
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information that can be readily otherwise 
informed. The form and species-way of an indi-
vidual animal are reduced to the expression of 
certain genetic information - form follows 
information. The way of living toward an animal 
consistent with the concept of genetic material 
or manipulable information is, by our definition 
of the term, as generic being. 
T he spider's web notwithstanding, 
human beings are the 
consummate cage-makers. 
Only we can exhibit an animal. 
Here we will locate a concept of species and 
species-ways that is mid-way between the 
Aristotelian concept of a fixed and intrinsic 
nature and these contemporary denials of a 
species-specific nature. Ecology directs us 
foremost to an ecosystem and to the relations 
that comprise that system. In ecology species 
refers to a typical morphology and behavior and 
its relation to a certain environment. But envi-
ronment (etymologically from F. virer, to turn; by 
extension meaning circuit or surround) does not 
capture the constitutive role of that relation in 
animal being. An animal is not merely sur-
rounded by, so much as it is a constituent part of 
that system. Species-ways are part of what effects 
a certain ecosystem. In the other direction, the 
effect of ecosystem on species-ways is as consti-
tutive and is better captured by the terms "habit" 
and "habitat" (L. habere, to have and hold) than 
by the term environment. When we say that the 
animal inhabits a certain habitat we mean that a 
particular habitat is the necessary locus of being 
of a particular species. The dynamic relation 
between lion and lion country is constitutive of 
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lion being. That part of animal being that is 
attributable to species membership is radically 
dependent on natural habitat for more than 
merely a surround or medium, it is necessary for 
the animal to be that species. The animals of a 
particular species dwell there in the sense that 
they have their being there. Lyons (1989, per-
sonal communication) writes that "the flower is 
part of the bee's anatomy." This is true in the 
sense that habitat and habit are a unity necessary 
for the possibility of that insect-way. 
By comparison a human being is its habitat in 
a weaker sense. Through reflection he or she can 
take up a posture to a given environment and, 
thereby, can transform it symbolically to create 
with it a world. Unable to construct a world by 
taking a reflective posture to selected features of 
its environment, a nonhuman animal becomes 
itself only through certain features of that 
habitat. A nonhuman animal's radical depen-
dence on a species specific habitat is part of its 
ontological vulnerability to the reduction to 
generic animal. By contrast, through his or her 
power of symbolic transformation a human 
being in a cage or prison is limited to ontic suf-
fering. He or she remains a being burdened with 
the ability to make the meaning of that expe-
rience explicit. 7 However, the loss of a lion 
deprived of lion country or of a bee without 
flowers is ontological as well as ontic. 
In another work (Shapiro, in press, b.), I 
describe how my dog seeks and establishes pos-
sible habitations, places that he appropriates as 
his own and which serve as vantage points or 
points of view for him. An animal's habitat is his 
or her dwelling place not only in the sense of pro-
viding a particular home butin the sense of being 
the substance of his or her species identification. 
A species way or habit requires inhabiting a 
certain habitat. Niche is constitutive, not substi-
tutive. The notion that an animal's telos remains 
inside, intact and unchanging as long as its bio-
logical integrity is maintained is a limited and 
convenient abstraction. To "ex-hibit" an animal in 
a cage is to take it out of its habitat which is to 
lose its species-way which is to reduce it to a 
generic animal. 
As we indicated we have taken "caging" as a 
metaphor for the possibility of the reduction to 
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generic animal. Obviously, not all caging of all 
animals has that effect. Now we must say when 
that reduction actually does occur. We anticipate 
several major problems. Is not what a rat does -
whether in a field, apartment building, or cage 
- rat behavior? Is not the wayan animal adjusts 
to whatever manipulation of environment to 
which it is exposed its typical species-way? If 
many species adjust in a similar way or with 
similar behavior to radical manipulation or 
depletion of setting, is not that still a species-way, 
although common across species? If a species is 
selectively bred or genetically engineered to 
behave in a certain way in a depleted envi-
ronment, is not that behavior now its species-
way? How can we locate the generic animal in all 
of this? 
Clearly human intervention produces massive 
change in animals on an individual and species 
level. Interventions on the species level occur 
through manipulation of habitat or genetic con-
stitution. Whether in the service of preserving 
endangered species through habitat man-
agement or artificial propagation strategies, or of 
increasing the popUlation of "game" animals by 
habitat manipulation, or of increasing the com-
patibility of companion animals through selective 
breeding, many of these changes involve either 
or both external and internal te/os manipulation 
without yet producing a generic animal. 
Whatever the ecological and social effects and 
ethics of our having a sandhill crane raise 
whooping crane babies, or our producing deer 
in abundance by exterminating their natural 
predators, or our breeding less aggressive black 
labs or more efficient sheep dogs, their species 
integrity is not in question. But consider crating 
a veal calf or selectively breeding a mouse so that 
it is susceptible to audiogenic seizures. Intuitively, 
these are more extreme examples of, respec-
tively, external and internal te/os manipulation. 
Perhaps they are extreme in the sense that the 
manipUlation is more grossly in the service of 
human need rather than extensions of the par-
ticular species defining features. What it tastes 
like is not directly a part of a cow's species-way, 
although it is partly a product of what it eats or is 
allowed or forced to eat. Still, is not a calf who is 
not allowed to turn around or to see daylight still 
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a calf, and an obese or hairless or tumerogenic 
rat who cannot gnaw or scurry or explore still a 
rat, however pathetic? 
I suggest that we actually have produced a 
generic animal when that animal is chronically 
bored. When the relation between environment 
and animal is chronically such that the animal 
has no interest in its environment, the habitat-
habit unity that sustains and constitutes a species-
way has been split asunder and the lion or 
chicken or rat is no longer. 
Wemelsfelder (1984) offers various indices for 
determining the presence of boredom in an 
animal, such as stereotypic movement, redirected 
activity, vacuum behavior, and immobility over 
long periods (p. 133). Approaching the present 
thesis, she further characterizes boredom as a 
state in which an animal "misses the opportunity 
to perform its specific behavior" (p. 117), or 
"does not have the chance to perform the 
behavior which is part of a species-specific range 
of behavioral possibilities" (p. 124). 
This criterion, the presence or absence of 
chronic boredom, offers a solution to the 
problem of when or whether an animal selec-
tively bred or genetically engineered to adjust to 
being caged is a generic animal. By the way, the 
result of such practices is apparently not as 
effective as one might think. Mter hundreds of 
generations of life in captivity even the albino rat 
retains, at least potentially, certain species spe-
cific behaviors such as burrowing (Wemelsfelder, 
pp. 126-7); and after thousands of years of 
domestication the domestic dog retains vestigial 
instinctive behaviors associated with its genetic 
wild forebears (Fox, 1978). However, to whatever 
degree that we can or could genetically engineer 
an animal to adjust to being caged, we are 
arguing that if the animal is chronically bored it 
has been ontologically reduced to a generic 
animal. Whether it "misses an opportunity" for 
species-specific behavior that is genetically 
"present" or whether it no longer has that 
genetic potential, if the animal is chronically 
bored it is living without a species-way. 
When this criterion is fulfilled, "adjusting" an 
animal through genetic manipUlation to a radi-
cally deprived environment does not produce a 
new species-way. If the resultant animal is chroni-
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cally bored, "cage-country" and "cage-animal" 
behavior are not a new habitat-habit unity for 
there is no dynamic or living relation between 
them. Finally, while the stereotyped behavior that 
is pathognomic of boredom is common across 
species, it is precisely not species behavior both 
because it is not distinctive or specific and because 
it is not a way of inhabiting, of dynamically living 
in and being through a particular habitat. A 
chronically bored animal is an ex-hibited animal 
which is, then, a generic animal. While neither all 
caging nor all genetic engineering results in such, 
these are the primary means of producing this 
reduction. The spider's web notwithstanding, 
human beings are the consummate cage-makers. 
Only we can exhibit an animal. 
While to this point we have restricted our lan-
guage to the more neutral "reduction" or "loss," 
we now are in a position to consider whether this 
second ontological reduction is harmful. In what 
sense is the actual loss of species-way harmful? 
Beginning with Singer's seminal work (1975), 
the history of the contemporary animal rights 
movement can be told in terms of a broadening 
of the concept of suffering in animals. This pro-
gression is most clear in the context oflaboratory 
animal research and attempts at its regulation. 
Initially, the literature on housing of lab animals 
dealt only with the provision of a minimal 
standard of comfort for an animal, while experi-
mentation protocols addressed only the mini-
mization of physical pain where possible within 
the demands of the study. However, these 
restricted notions of minimal creature comfort 
and of physical pain are slowly (and resistantly) 
expanding to include the subjective experience 
of distress, stress, anxiety and ill-being, and, even 
absent felt-experience, to include loss of 
function, deprivation of physical, social and intel-
lective stimulation, and death. 
I want to argue here that the ontological 
reduction to generic animal is a distinct form of 
harm that yet further broadens the scope of suf-
fering that we visit on an animal. 
Consider a caged animal that through some 
combination of selective breeding or genetic 
engineering and habitat restriction is chronically 
bored. In what sense is this animal being 
harmed? Boredom itself is arguably harmful. 
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Wemelsfelder characterizes it as a form of dis-
tress (p. 137). She speculates that this distress 
may be related to helplessness, itself a form of 
stress, or to understimulation. However, in 
addition to this subjective state, intuitively, the 
loss of species-way is itself harmful. 
To be clear, our focus here is not the more 
typical concern with the harm done through 
species extinction induced through human inter-
vention. Arguments proffered to account for the 
harm consequent upon the loss of a species-way 
through extinction are difficult enough to make. 
Often, such ethics are baldly speciesist, locating 
the harm exclusively in concern for human 
welfare. For example, Wilson describes a conser-
vation ethic (1984, pp. 119-40) in which "each of 
the millions of species can be visualized as a book 
in a library." The survival of a species provides 
greater diversity of genetic material as a resource 
for our health through potential innovations in 
medicine. It also provides a richer intellectual 
nutrient for our "biophilia," the "innate 
[human] tendency to focus on life and lifelike 
processes" (p. 1). Incidentally, this emphasis on 
animals as genetic material for human welfare 
and stimulation is close to an apology for 
unbridled genetic engineering. 
In any case, our concern is with the harm 
done to a living individual animal that is bereft of 
species-way. Following Kohak (1984), it would be 
tempting to argue that an animal's loss of 
species-way is harmful in terms of the loss of the 
natural. Kohak speaks of the "moral sense of 
nature" (p. 70). In addition to the "economy of 
nature," the efficient working of an ecosystem, 
"the sense of nature includes also a dimension of 
value" (p. 70). There is an "integrity, a rightness" 
to the presence of the chipmunk peering out at 
us from his or her hideaway. An animal can live 
in nature in the sense of being sensitive to the 
rhythms, light, and spatiality of day and night, 
and of the changing seasons. For Kohak, our 
contribution to their loss of that sense is a moral 
issue for there is a rightness in that natural 
presence for them. The battery chicken or labo-
ratory rat who knows only constant light or tem-
perature is harmed by the deprivation of natural 
change. By this neo-naturalism, my dog's appreci-
ation of the rhythm of my business day, which is 
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hardly synchronized to the temporality of the 
Maine seasons or days, is a harm. Yet he and I 
both enjoy that and other socially constructed 
rhythms. We live together in a mixed community 
(Callicott, 1988) based on shared and, appar-
ently, enjoyable although unnatural rhythms, 
boundaries, and other parameters. 
Or, following Callicott, we could argue that 
producing a generic animal is wrong for it is a 
betrayal of an implicit agreement we entered 
into with animals of certain species when we first 
formed mixed communities with them. The 
guinea fowl turned barnyard chicken did not 
bargain for this reduction to intensively pro-
duced meat and eggs. This is helpful but limited 
in that it does not indicate in what way the par-
ticular betrayal of reduction to generic animal, 
among the many betrayals of domesticated, labo-
ratory and companion animals, is harmful. It 
really begs the questions of how and whether the 
reduction to generic animal is a particular and 
additional form of harm. 
Singer argues that an animal has interests and 
that he or she is harmed and, therefore, wronged 
when deprived of situations or objects through 
which those in terests can be realized (1975). 
However, in these terms, boredom is not merely 
the absence of such objects. In boredom, an 
animal has lost the capacity for interest itself, not 
merely the opportunity to fulfill interests. 
Beyond the distress inherent to it, boredom is 
harmful for it deprives an animal, radically, of 
interest, of that attitude which directs it to the 
environment as a source of stimulation. In the 
terms of the present argument, a generic animal 
is bereft of species-specific interests (and of indi-
vidual interests as well) for the habitat-habit unity 
which provides the matrix of those interests has 
been dissolved. A generic animal is harmed in 
that., being bored, it no longer has interests. 
Incidentally, the addition of this harm may be 
a problem for Singer's account for is not being 
an interest-bearer a condition for the application 
of the pleasure-pain calculus of utilitarianism? 
Perhaps Singer might argue that even the 
generic animal was once or is still potentially an 
interest-bearer and that, therefore, one can 
estimate the loss of pleasure of unfulfilled 
interests. However, that claim gets weaker and 
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the estimate more difficult to the degree that an 
animal is from birth, chronically and perma-
nently a generic animal. 
Regan's deontological account appears to work 
better here. With Regan, we can say that the pro-
duction of an animal that lives without having 
interests is wrong, for an animal has an inherent 
value that inheres in its "having interests." The 
deprivation of that capacity is a distinguishable 
form of harm. 
We conclude that to cage an animal, in the par-
ticular meaning we have given that term, is morally 
objectionable. Beyond those ontic harms tradi-
tionally associated with caging an animal, the pro-
duction of a generic animal is a distinguishable, 
additional, and morally objectionable ontological 
form of harm. 
1 For Heidegger (1962), ontic refers to the particular con-
dition and experience of an entity, that person, dog, or rock; 
while ontological refers to a more general being, a structure 
of structures that provide the condition for the possibility of 
the particular entity to be what he or she or it is. 
2 It is arguable whether this structure is permanently 
absent or temporarily blocked. 
~ For my general approach to phenomenology, see Shapiro 
(1985); for a mixed method developed for the study of non-
human animals, see Shapiro (in press, b.). 
'Arguably, Gallup (1977) has demonstrated a kind of "self-
recognition" in the Great Apes only. 
5 However, Arluke (1988) has found that this objectifying 
attitude is an ambivalent one. 
6 This reduction to a generic being, readied to disclose 
itself, is consisten t with Heidegger's description of the 
attitude wherein we live toward objects as "ready-to-hand" -
as there for and only meaningful in terms of our possible use 
of that disclosed being (I962. p. 98). However, the present 
attitude also requires a decontextualizing and ahistorical 
posture not requisite to Heidegger's zuhanden. 
7 Scarry (I985) describes the moment of the intense pain 
of systematic torture as an "unmaking" of the world. 
Systematic torture, then, may be a momentary exception to 
this distinction between human and nonhuman animals. 
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